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Model Sentencing Guidelines §2B1 Theft,
Embezzlement, Receipt of Stolen Property, Property
Destruction, and Offenses Involving Fraud and Deceit
(a) Base Offense Level: The base offense level for all
offenses covered by this guideline is i.
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(i) Loss: If the loss exceeded $io,ooo, increase the
offense level as follows:
(A) More than $io,ooo add i
(B) More than $5o,ooo add 2
(C) More than $200,000 add 3
(D) More than $i million add 4
(E) More than $20 million add 5
(F) More than $ioo million add 6
(2) Other financial harms: If the offense involved one or
more of the following indicators of special financial
harmfulness, increase the offense level by one level:
(A) The offense substantially jeopardized the
safety and soundness of a financial institution;
(B) The offense substantially endangered the sol-
vency or financial security of an organization
that, at any time during the offense, (a) was a
publicly traded company, or (b) had i,ooo or
more employees.
(3) Victims: If the offense involved twenty-five or more
victims, increase the offense level by one level.
(4) Particularly blameworthy offenses or conduct: If
the offense involved one or more of the following
circumstances, increase the offense level by
one level:
(A) The offense involved receiving stolen property,
and the defendant was in the business of
receiving and selling stolen property;
(B) The defendant was, at the time of the offense,
an officer or director of a publicly traded com-
pany which was a victim of the offense;
(C) The offense of conviction was a criminal viola-
tion of securities law and, at the time of the
offense, the defendant was a registered broker
or dealer, or an investment adviser;
(D) The offense of conviction was a criminal viola-
tion of commodities law and, at the time of the
offense, the defendant was an officer or direc-
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tor of a futures commission merchant or an
introducing broker, a commodities trading
advisor, or a commodity pool operator;
(E) The offense involved a violation of a prior spe-
cific judicial or administrative order,
injunction, or decree;
(F) The defendant was convicted of an offense
under 18 U.S.C. S T030(a)(5)(A)(i);
(G) The defendant was convicted of an offense
under 18 U.S.C. S 103o, and the offense caused a
substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure.
(c) Mandatory factors to be considered in setting sentence
within applicable range
If the offense involved one or more of the follow-
ing circumstances, the court [shall/should ordinarily]
impose a sentence above the midpoint of the applicable
sentencing range:
(i) Other financial harms: The offense substantially
endangered the solvency or financial security of
ten or more persons;
(2) Planning activity: The offense involved "sophisti-
cated means."
(d) Advisory factors to be considered in setting sentence
within applicable range
(I) Aggravating factors: In determining the sentence
within the applicable sentencing range, the court
should consider whether any of the following
aggravating factors exist:
(A) The offense involved theft from a person;
(B) The offense involved multiple victims;
(C) The offense substantially endangered the sol-
vency or financial security of fewer than ten
persons, or of a business entity smaller than
that described in section (b) (2) (B);
(D) The offense involved misappropriation of a
trade secret and the defendant knew or
intended that the offense would benefit a for-
eign government, foreign instrumentality, or
foreign agent;
(E) The offense involved a misrepresentation
that the defendant was acting on behalf of a
charitable, educational, religious, or govern-
ment agency;
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(F) The offense involved a misrepresentation or
other fraudulent action in the course of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding;
(G) A primary objective of the offense was an
aggravating, non-monetary objective, as for
example, if a primary objective of the offense
was to inflict emotional harm;
(H) The offense created a risk of substantial loss
beyond the loss determined for purposes of
setting the offense level; or
(I) In a case involving access devices or unlawfully
produced or unlawfully obtained means of
identification:
(i) The offense caused substantial harm to
the victim's reputation or credit record, or
the victim suffered a substantial incon-
venience related to repairing the victim's
reputation or a damaged credit record;
(ii) An individual whose means of identifica-
tion the defendant used to obtain
unlawful means of identification is erro-
neously arrested or denied a job because
an arrest record has been made in that
individual's name.
(iii) The defendant produced or obtained
numerous means of identification with
respect to one individual and essentially
assumed that individual's identity.
(2) Mitigating factors: In determining whether a sen-
tence within the applicable sentencing range, the
court should consider whether any of the following
mitigating factors exist:
(A) In a case in which both actual and intended
loss are found to have occurred, the intended
loss was substantially in excess of the
actual loss.
(B) In a case in which actual loss is found to have
occurred, the gain the defendant personally
received or expected to receive was zero or very
small in comparison to the actual loss.
(e) Downward departures
In cases in which the offense level determined
under this guideline substantially overstates the seri-
ousness of the offense, a downward departure below
the bottom of the otherwise applicable sentencing
range may be warranted.
Application Notes:
i. Definitions. For purposes of this guideline:
"Financial institution" includes any institution
described in 18 U.S.C. ff20, ff 656, ff657, ff 1005, ff 1oo6, f
1007, orff 1014; any state or foreign bank, trust company,
credit union, insurance company, investment company,
mutualfund, savings (building and loan) association,
union or employee pension fund; any health, medical, or
hospital insurance association; brokers and dealers regis-
tered, or required to be registered, with the Securities and
Exchange Commission;futures commodity merchants and
commodity pool operators registered, or required to be regis-
tered, with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission;
and any similar entity, whether or not insured by the frd-
eral government. "Union or employee pension fund" and
"any health, medical, or hospital insurance association,"
primarily include large pension funds that serve many per-
sons (e.g., pension funds of large national and
international organizations, unions, and corporations
doing substantial interstate business), and associations
that undertake to provide pension, disability, or other bene-
fits (e.g., medical or hospitalization insurance) to large
numbers of persons.
"Foreign instrumentality" and 'foreign agent" have the
meanings given those terms in 18 U.S.C. ff 1839(1) and
(2), respectively.
"Mass marketing" means a plan, program, promotion,
or campaign that is conducted through solicitation by tele-
phone, mail, the internet or other means to induce a large
number of persons to purchase goods or services, participate
in a contest or sweepstakes, or investforfinancial profit.
"Publicly traded company" means an issuer (A) with a
class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. ff 781); or (B) that is
required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. ff 780(d)). "Issuer" has
the meaning given that term in section 3 of the (15 U.S.C.
ff 78c).
"Sophisticated means" means especially complex or
especially intricate conduct pertaining to the execution or
concealment of an offense. Conduct such as hiding assets or
transactions, or both, through the use offictitious entities,
corporate shells, or offihore financial accounts ordinarily
indicates sophisticated means. The use of mass marketing
establishes the existence of sophisticated means.
"Theft from the person of another" means theft, without
the use offorce, of property that was being held by another
person or was within arms reach. Examples include pick-
pocketing and nonforcible purse-snatching, such as the theft
of a purse from a shopping cart.
"Trade secret" has the meaning given that term in 18
U.S.C. ff 1839(3).
"Victim" means any person who sustained any part of
the actual loss determined under subsection (b) (i), or any
person that the defendant intended should sustain a loss.
"Person" includes individuals, corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies.
2. "Loss'.
A. Subject to the exclusions in subsection E below, loss is
the greater of actual loss or intended loss.
i. "Actual loss" means the reasonably foreseeable
pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.
ii. "Intended loss" means the pecuniary harm that
was intended to result from the offense, and
includes intended pecuniary harm that would
have been impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g., as
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in a governmental sting operation, or an insur-
ance fraud in which the claim exceeded the
insured value).
iii. "Pecuniary harm" means harm that is monetary
or that otherwise is readily measurable in money.
Accordingly, pecuniary harm does not include
emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other
non-economic harm.
iv. "Reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm" means
pecuniary harm that the defendant knew or, under
the circumstances, reasonably should have known,
was a potential result of the offense.
B. Determination of loss for purposes of determining
offense level-The finder offact need not determine the
amount of loss with precision. However, any increase
in the defendant's offense level based on loss amount
pursuant to Section 2B1 (b) (i) must be supported by
an admission by the defendant or afinding beyond a
reasonable doubt pursuant to the provisions of Model
Sentencing Guidelines 1f1.3 that the loss was greater
than the amount necessary to trigger a particular
offense level increase. For example, in a jury trial, an
increase of three offense levels pursuant to Section
2B1 (b) (1) (C) could only be imposed based on afind-
ing by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the loss
was more than $200,000.
C. Estimate of loss for purposes of determining a sentence
within range-In order to determine an appropriate
sentence within the applicable guideline range, the sen-
tencing court will ordinarily find it necessary to have a
more precise estimate of loss than the finding that the
amount of the loss is greater than the amount neces-
sary to trigger a particular offense level increase
pursuant to Section 2Bi (b) (1). For example, if two
defendants in different cases were both found to have
inflicted losses greater than $200,000, thus qualifying
both for a three-offense-level increase for loss pursuant
to Section 2B1 (b) (i) (C), but one of the defendants
caused a loss of $201,000, while the other caused a loss
of $999,ooo, the differing loss amounts would, all else
being equal,justify the imposition of a higher sentence
within the applicable range on the second defendant
than on the first. In order to obtain a more precise esti-
mate of loss than that necessary to apply the offense
level increases in Section 2B1(b) (1), a court sitting in a
jury trial may, with the consent of the parties, ask the
jury to return a special verdict containing such an esti-
mate based on a preponderance of the evidence.
Alternatively, if requested by at least one of the parties,
the court should make such an estimate itself as part of
the sentencing process, as it would any other aggravat-
ing factor relevant to determination of a sentence
within the applicable range, pursuant to the provisions
of Model Sentencing Guidelines ffl. 5.
D. Gain-The finder offact may use the gain that
resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of
loss, but only if itfinds, pursuant to the provisions of
Model Sentencing Guidelines ff1.3 (if the finder offact
is a jury or ajudge presiding in a bench trial) or ff.5
(if the finder offact is ajudge deciding facts relevant to
determination of the sentence within the applicable
guideline range), that there was a loss, but that the
amount of that loss cannot reasonably be determined.
E. Exclusions from loss-Loss shall not include the follow-
ing:
(i) Interest of any kind,finance charges, late fres,
penalties, amounts based upon an agreed-upon
return or rate of return, or other similar costs.
(ii) Costs to the government of and costs incurred by
victims primarily to aid the government in, the
prosecution and criminal investigation of an
offense.
F. Credits against loss-In determining the amount of
loss for purposes of adjusting the offense level pursuant
to Section 2B1 (b) (1), and for purposes of determining
the defendant's sentence within the applicable range,
the amount of loss shall be reduced by the following:
(i) The money returned, and the fair market value of
the property returned and the services rendered, by
the defendant or other persons acting jointly with
the defrndant, to the victim before the offense was
detected. The time of detection of the offense is the
earlier of(I) the time the offense was discovered by
a victim or government agency; or (II) the time
the defendant knew that the offense was detected or
about to be detected by a victim or government
agency.
(ii) In a case involving collateral pledged or otherwise
provided by the defendant, the amount the victim
has recovered at the time of sentencing from dispo-
sition of the collateral, or if the collateral has not
been disposed of by that time, the fair market value
of the collateral at the time of sentencing.
G. [DRAFTER'S NOTE: THE FOREGOING SEC-
TIONS INCL UDE MOST OF THE IMPORTANT
RULES ON THE DEFINITION OF LOSS. SOME
OF THE MORE PARTICULAR RULES RELAT-
ING TO SPECIAL CASES OR CIRCUMSTANCES
WOULD DOUBTLESS ALSO BE INCLUDED IN
A FINAL VERSION OF THIS GUIDELINE.]
3. Multiple-count indictments
Some fraudulent schemes may result in multiple-count
indictments, depending on the technical elements of the
offense. In determining the loss for purposes of applying the
offense level increases of Section 2B1 (b) (1), the cumulative
loss caused or intended to be caused by a common scheme
or course ofconduct should be used in determining the
offense level, regardless of the number of counts of convic-
tion. However, an actual or intended loss may only be
counted if it was intended by the defendant to result from,
or was the reasonably foreseeable result of a scheme or
course ofconduct alleged in at least one of the counts of con-
viction. In determining the loss for purposes of setting a
defendant's sentence within the applicable guideline range,
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the court may consider, in addition, such other loss, if any,
that should properly be considered by application of Model
Sentencing Guidelines fi.6 (Determination of Aggravating
Factors Relevant to Sentence Within Range).
4. Enhancements for 2 5 or more victims and endangering
financial institutions and other large business entities, dou-
ble counting
A case of sufficient magnitude to endanger the safety or
soundness of a financial institution, or the solvency or
financial security of a publicly traded company or a corpo-
ration with more than i,ooo employees, is highly likely to
involve more than 25 victims. Accordingly, in order to avoid
over-punishment for closely correlated factors, if one of the
enhancements in Model Sentencing Guidelines ff2Bi (b ) (2)
is applied, do not apply the enhancement for more than 25
victims of Model Sentencing Guidelines ff2B1 (b) (3).
5. Enhancements for officer or director of publicly traded cor-
poration and role in the offense, double counting
A defendant who receives an enhancement pursuant to
Model Sentencing Guidelines fJ'2B1 (b) (4) (B) as "an officer
or director of a publicly traded company which was a vic-
tim of the offense" is also highly likely to be "an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor of a criminal activity that
involved five or more participants" and thus to be eligible
for an enhancement under Model Sentencing Guidelines
3.1 (a) (1). In order to avoid over-punishment for closely cor-
related factors, only one of these enhancements may be
applied to a single defendant.
6. Limitation on sophisticated means aggravator in
high-loss cases
A defendant convicted of an economic offense that
caused or was intended to cause a loss of more than $1 mil-
lion is highly likely to employ sophisticated means to
accomplish this end. Accordingly, in order to avoid over-
punishment for closely correlated factors, the sentencing
judge should not rely on Model Sentencing Guidelines
2B1 (c)(2) tojustify a sentence above the midpoint of the
applicable range in any case involving an actual or
intended loss in excess of $1 million.
7. [DRAFTER'S NOTE: THE FOREGOING SECTIONS
INCLUDE MOST OF THE IMPORTANT RULES ON
THE APPLICATION OF THIS ECONOMIC CRIME
G UIDELINE. SOME OTHER MORE PARTICULAR
RULES RELATING TO SPECIAL CASES OR CIR-
CUMSTANCES WOULD DOUBTLESS ALSO BE




I have a particular personal interest in the configuration of
the federal sentencing guidelines governing economic
offenses. I spent some five years working (with many oth-
ers) toward the reconfiguration of the old, formerly
separate, theft and fraud guidelines into the current con-
solidated economic crime guideline, U.S.S.G. S2BI.i. I And
shortly after that process was completed in 2001, I became
enmeshed in the debate over the sentencing components
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2oo2 and the ensuing round
of guidelines amendments.2 I have taken several general
lessons from this long experience.
First, the large number and differing types of eco-
nomic crimes embraced by federal statutes make drafting
generally applicable sentencing rules for these offenses
extraordinarily challenging.3
Second, the Sentencing Commission has done a com-
mendable job of identifying factors that ought to be
considered in sentencing an economic offender. It is hard
to deny that the amount of loss inflicted by an economic
offense,4 the complexity of the scheme devised by the
defendant,5 the number of affected victims,6 the size of
the defendant's personal gain,7 damage to financial insti-
tutions or large corporations,8 the position of defendants
within victim entities,9 and most of the other factors now
embodied in Section 2BLi are relevant to offense serious-
ness and thus to punishment.
Third, nonetheless, the current guidelines do a poor
job of quantifying the sentencing effects of all these fac-
tors. The present economic crime guideline, U.S.S.G.
2BI.I, embodies two basic errors. The first is the assign-
ment of independent weight to a large number of factors
that in practice are closely correlated. For example, the
current guidelines impose offense level increases for a
large number of victims, a sophisticated scheme, deriva-
tion of a large personal gain, and high corporate position.
All of these factors are closely correlated in the sense that
a substantial corporate fraud is very likely to involve all of
them. Yet each of these factors generates a separate
offense level increase. More importantly, each of these
factors is also closely correlated with a high loss amount,
which imposes a separate and very substantial offense
level increase of its own. In effect, what the Guidelines
have done over time is to tease out many of the factors for
which loss was already a rough proxy and give them inde-
pendent weight in the offense level calculus. This first
error has been compounded by a second, the failure to
remember the logarithmic structure of the Guidelines'
sentencing table. Because the sentencing table was con-
structed according to constraints imposed by the so-called
"25 percent rule,"I" the size of the sentence increase asso-
ciated with each one-offense-level movement up the table
increases steadily the further one travels up the vertical
offense level axis. Thus, a one-offense-level increase at
the bottom of the table changes a defendant's sentencing
range not at all," while the same one-offense-level
increase at the top of the sentencing table increases the
defendant's minimum sentence by three years and his
maximum sentence from thirty years to life imprison-
ment.1 2 The result is that factors for which loss is already
a proxy not only have been given independent weight but
also can impose dramatic increases in prison time
because they add offense levels on top of those already
imposed for loss itself.
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Fourth, the trend toward over-quantification of dosely
correlated factors was already pronounced at the time of
the promulgation of the 2001 Economic Crime Package
consolidating and amending the theft and fraud guidelines,
but the political storm unleashed by the corporate scandals
of 2001-2002 produced guideline amendments that dic-
tate frankly absurd sentences for defendants in large fraud
cases. For example, had Kenneth Lay lived to face sentenc-
ing in the Enron case, and if the current guidelines were
applied to his case, his offense level could easily have been
as high as 55-which translates to the mandatory life
imprisonment called for by an offense level of 43, plus
twelve additional levels.3 No other class of federal crime
produces offense levels this high. An armed bank robber
who discharged a firearm, caused permanent injury to a
victim, kidnapped a hostage, and got away with $io million
would receive, at most, an offense level of 44. 14 Even a ter-
rorist or serial killer who committed fifty premeditated
first-degree murders could score no higher than an offense
level 48.5 Moreover, the average sentences actually imposed
for robbery and murder in federal courts are still further
removed from the sentences prescribed by the Guidelines
for white-collar crime. In 2005, the average sentence actu-
ally imposed on robbers with no prior criminal record was
only fifty-seven months, or less than five years., 6 Even rob-
bers who were also Criminal History Category VI career
offenders only received an average of i68 months, or four-
teen years. 7 The average sentence for all murderers
regardless of prior criminal record is less than nineteen
years.' 8 And in 2005 the mean sentence for murderers who
were also career offenders was twenty-five years,' 9
markedly less than the life imprisonment plus twelve levels
suggested by the Guidelines for first-time fraud defendants
in the circumstances of Mr. Lay.
Even assuming that any form of stealing, on no matter
how grand a scale, merits life imprisonment, the fact that
the guidelines contemplate life imprisonment-and then
a bunch more-for such crimes reveals the degree to
which emotion has overtaken logic in this area. After all,
once you have sentenced a man to a federal term of life
imprisonment, which really is imprisonment for one's
natural life, there is nothing left to do to him, save perhaps
spitting on his grave. And the overkill of the current eco-
nomic crime guidelines is not limited to the most culpable
offenders in the most exceptional cases. The over-quantifi-
cation of closely correlated factors is so extreme that a
corporate officer, stockbroker, or commodities trader
engaged in a stock fraud causing a loss as low as $2.5 mil-
lion could be subject to a guidelines sentence of life
imprisonment.20
I do not wish to be misunderstood here. Prior to the
advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, sentences for
serious economic crimes were far too low. The Guidelines
did a service by ensuring that far more white-collar and
other economic offenders saw the inside of a prison cell.
Moreover, in my own view (which is not necessarily shared
by other members of the working group for this project), the
general trend during the guidelines period toward increas-
ing the severity of economic crime sentences has, until
recently, been a desirable one. To mention only the most
obvious points: (i) thievery and fraud are serious crimes,
particularly when the financial harm is great, and deserve
punishment on par with other serious offenses; and (2) eco-
nomic offenders, particularly white-collar criminals, are
usually seen as more apt than other defendants to be
rational calculators of risk and reward, and thus the real
prospect of serious prison time should act as a meaningful
deterrent. That said, the combination of political pressure
and some failures of foresight on the part of those involved
in revising the economic crimes guidelines in recent years
(including myself) has produced Guidelines sentencing
ranges for moderate-to-serious white-collar offenders that
simply cannot be rationally defended. It is one thing to say
that those who steal tens or hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars should do at least some prison time, or even that those
who steal millions of dollars should serve long sentences. It
is quite another to write rules that purport to make white-
collar crime the most severely punished class of noncapital
offenses known to federal law."1 Moreover, one should per-
haps be cautious in absolutely requiring very long sentences
for high-loss economic crime cases when, in many
instances, the line between a criminal violation and high-
risk, entrepreneurial, but legal, behavior can be fairly thin.
As a consequence, one objective of this reconceived
economic crime guideline has been to maintain rough
outcome neutrality in comparison to the current Guide-
lines for defendants involved in cases of low to moderate
seriousness, while restoring some rationality to sentences
at the higher end of the spectrum. This end is achieved
largely by reemphasizing a central insight of the original
fraud and theft guidelines, namely that loss is a good
proxy for many, perhaps most, of the recognized indica-
tors of offense seriousness in economic offenses. Hence,
loss should be the primary determinant of sentencing
range. Those factors for which loss serves as a rough
proxy, many of which have been teased out and given
independent significance over the years, are largely
treated as factors to be considered by the court when set-
ting a sentence within the applicable guidelines range.
Where they are retained as factors relevant to setting
offense level, either in this guideline or in the generally
applicable factors enumerated in Chapter 3 of these
model guidelines, the application notes limit their effect
by precluding separate offense level enhancements for
obviously correlated factors such as "more than 25 vic-
tims" and endangering the financial well-being of large
organizations (Application Note 4), or for being an officer
or director of a publicly traded company and role in the
offense (Application Note 5).
The Loss Table
The loss table proposed here reduces the number of deci-
sion points for loss from the current sixteen down to six.
Practically speaking, because the number of cases involv-
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ing losses in excess of $20 million is probably fewer than
a dozen each year,2 2 the number of commonly used deci-
sion points is reduced to four-more than $io,ooo; more
than $5o,ooo; more than $2oo,ooo; and more than $i
million. Ever since Blakely raised the specter of putting all
guidelines factors to juries, a commonly voiced concern of
judges and lawyers charged with litigating fraud cases has
been the difficulty of asking juries to make precise deter-
minations of loss amount. The marked simplification of
the loss table proposed here should ameliorate, if not com-
pletely eliminate, the practical difficulties associated with
proving loss at trial. All that would be necessary to meet
the constitutional standard of Blakely and Booker is that
the government allege and the jury find a loss in excess of
one of the cutoff points. Should either party wish to estab-
lish a more precise loss figure for purposes of arguing that
loss amount justifies a particular sentence within the
applicable range, Application Note 2C suggests several
methods of establishing such a figure. The Application
Note proposes that a court could, with the consent of the
parties, submit a special interrogatory to the jury asking
that it make a more specific determination of loss. Alter-
natively, the Note proposes that, upon request of at least
one of the parties, the court should employ the procedures
of Model Sentencing Guidelines 51.5 to make a more pre-
cise loss determination in the same way it would
determine any other aggravating factor relevant to imposi-
tion of a sentence within the applicable guideline range.
Non-loss Factors That Affect Offense Level
In the proposed guideline, all non-loss factors that affect
offense level are lumped into three groups: other financial
harms, 21BI(b)(2); victims, S2Bi(b)( 3 ); and particularly
blameworthy offenses or conduct, 52BrI(b)(4 ). A defendant
can receive only one upward sentence range bump per
group, even if the government were to charge and prove
more than one factor listed in a particular group. There-
fore, other than loss, there could only be three additional
upward adjustments of sentencing range in any given
case. Given the stringency of the requirements of subsec-
tion (b)(a), "Other Financial Harms," the maximum
number of available upward adjustments in all but the
most extraordinary case would be two.
The foregoing point has a corollary regarding simplicity
of proof at trial. Notice that most of the specific offense
characteristics (SOCs) in section (b)(4 ) are either established
simply by virtue of the identity of the offense of conviction
or would be part and parcel of the proof of the government's
case regardless of the existence of these sentencing provi-
sions. Because factors in (b)(3) arise so rarely, as a practical
matter, the government would be taxed in any given case
with proving only loss and one other sentence-enhancing
factor in addition to the statutory elements of the crime.
Mandatory Factors in Setting Sentence within Range
The first draft of this guideline identified four groups of
non-loss factors to be determined by the jury.
First, traditionally, the two primary means of determin-
ing offense seriousness in economic crime cases have
been the size of the crime in economic terms (the loss)
and indicators of special, complex planning activity.
Because, unlike many crimes against persons, economic
crimes are not distinguished by different culpable mental
states written into the elements of the offense, evidence of
complex planning activity has been deemed to show a
more blameworthy culpable mental state. In addition,
complex planning activity suggests a higher degree of
social dangerousness on the part of the offender. Accord-
ingly, the first draft of this guideline culled from the
current guidelines those factors that suggested complex
planning (number of victims and use of "sophisticated
means") and put them in a group.
Second, in more recent times, efforts have been made to
account for harm to victims other than their simple dollars-
and-cents losses. We have recognized that one who steals a
large amount from one who can afford it may be commit-
ting a less serious offense than stealing a smaller amount
from a victim for whom the loss is financially debilitating.
Likewise, one who commits a crime that brings down a
business organization causes harm to all those who depend
on that business for employment, retirement benefits, sales
for their own companies, and the like. The first draft of this
guideline culled factors of this sort from the current guide-
lines and put them in another group.
Third, although physical injuries rarely occur in theft
and fraud crimes, they occasionally do happen and the
current guidelines have provisions for that eventuality.
The first draft of this guideline included a separate group
of specific offense characteristics dealing with such cases.
Fourth, over time, Congress and the Commission have
identified certain types of economic crime as being more
serious than garden-variety thefts and frauds. These were
grouped together in what was section (b)(5) of the original
draft.
The present draft of the economic crime guideline
embodies several important changes to the original struc-
ture.
First, feedback from the working group suggested that
references to physical harm or the risk thereof should be
removed from the economic crime guideline to be
addressed when necessary by the general provision in
Model Sentencing Guidelines S3-3.
Second, I continue to think that both complex planning
activity and assessment of the degree of financial harm
caused beyond dollar loss amount are important considera-
tions in setting a sentence. Moreover, I lean to the view that
these considerations ought to play a mandatory role in set-
ting a sentence. However, the factual determinations
involved in assessing these factors are difficult in a jury
trial setting. For example, determining whether a particular
crime involved "sophisticated means" requires a compara-
tive judgment weighing the facts of the present crime
against other "typical" crimes. This is a task which is rela-
tively simple for a judge, but for which juries are poorly
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL. 18, NO. 5 - JUNE 2006
HeinOnline  -- 18 Fed. Sent. R. 335 2005-2006
equipped. Likewise, determining the effect of a crime on
the solvency and financial prospects of a number of victims
would be a lengthy, resource-intensive process before a
jury but could be addressed more expeditiously before a
judge. Accordingly, sophisticated means and individual vic-
tim solvency were removed from among the factors that
would be decided by a jury and would determine sentenc-
ing range, and are instead to be facts a judge must find. If
found, these facts would not change the defendant's sen-
tencing range. Rather, a finding of one or the other (or
both) of these facts would create either a requirement or a
form of presumption that the judge impose a sentence
above the midpoint of the otherwise applicable range.
Whether the finding would impose a requirement or pre-
sumption would depend on the form of words chosen from
the bracketed language in Section 2B1i(c). If the word
"shall" was selected, a sentence above the midpoint would
be required, or to put it more precisely, the midpoint of the
range would become, in effect, the new bottom of the appli-
cable range. If the phrase "should ordinarily" was selected,
the effect would be to create a presumption of a sentence
above the midpoint of the range.
The members of the defense bar affiliated with the
working group are unanimous in disapproving of the mid-
point mechanism, in either its mandatory or presumptive
form. The pros and cons of the idea are discussed in the
Editor's Observations at the beginning of this Issue. 3 If it
were decided that the victim solvency and sophisticated
means provisions of Section 2B1i(c) were undesirable,
these factors could readily be added to the list in Section
2Bi(d)(i) of aggravating factors relevant to determination
of sentence within range.
Advisory Factors in Setting Sentence within Range
The list of aggravating factors relevant to determination of
sentence within range, Model Sentencing Guidelines
S2B1i(d)(i), is composed of factors for which loss is already
a rough proxy (such as the existence of multiple victims
and endangerment of the financial security of fewer than
ten victims), nonmonetary harms (such as the existence of
a noneconomic criminal objective), and particular kinds of
economic crime that Congress has in the past suggested
should be sentenced more stringently (such as bankruptcy
fraud and access device fraud). These factors were catego-
rized as advisory factors to be considered in sentencing
within range rather than as factors setting offense level
either because, though relevant, they are already partially
accounted for through loss amount or some generally
applicable factor such as role in the offense, or because
they lack sufficient independent significance to merit a
full offense level adjustment.
Comparison of Outcomes under Current and
Model Guidelines
Critical to assessing any proposed revision of the current
federal sentencing guidelines is a comparison of the out-
comes that would be produced under the revised system
as compared to the system now in place. Several years ago,
in the course of analyzing the evolution of the federal eco-
nomic crimes guidelines, I prepared a set of hypothetical
cases demonstrating the persistent (and in recent years
dramatic) increases in the sentencing range prescribed by
successive versions of the Guidelines from 1987 through
the adoption of the 2003 post-Sarbanes-Oxley guidelines
amendments.24 A slightly modified version of that com-
parison is contained in Figures A and B below. Figure C
applies this model economic crimes guideline to the same
hypothetical cases. Figures A, B, and C are largely self-
explanatory; however, a few points should be highlighted.
First, as noted above, the model guideline proposed here
is roughly outcome- neutral for cases of low-to-moderate
seriousness. Among Defendants A through G, the old and
new ranges for Defendants A, B, D, E, and F overlap either
completely or predominantly. The sentencing range for
Defendant C, the postal worker who steals credit cards from
the mail, would be reduced from 30-37 months under the
current guidelines to 12-24 months under the model,
largely due to the omission in the model of the current large
offense level increase for theft of undelivered mail.5 Defen-
dant G, the computer expert who steals personal data online
to obtain $450,000 in merchandise and phony car loans,
would have a sentencing range of 87-io8 months under the
current guidelines and a range of 6o-96 months under the
model guidelines. This result is readily justifiable on the
ground that the offense level of 29 under the current guide-
lines results from application of several enhancements so
closely correlated as to verge on double counting of the
same factor-an increase of 14 levels for loss greater than
$400,ooo, a 2-level sophisticated means enhancement, a 2-
level enhancement for use of a special skill, and a 2-level
enhancement for more than ten victims. In the aggregate,
these separate factors do little more than describe aspects of
a moderately large complex fraud.
Second, again as noted above, the model guidelines
prescribe sentences for the most serious white-collar
offenders that are very high by historical standards but
somewhat less severe than those called for under current
guidelines. While some may note that adoption of this
model guideline would effectively return guidelines sen-
tences for high-loss white-collar fraud offenders to
pre-Sarbanes-Oxley levels, any fair-minded observer
would have to agree both that current high-end white-col-
lar guidelines sentences are irrational and that the
sentences called for by the model are quite tough. More-
over, the sentencing ranges in the model are consistent
with the sentences actually being imposed in cases of this
sort. For example, Defendant J is patterned on the lead
defendants in the round of corporate fraud cases that
began with the Enron bankruptcy. The model guideline
prescribes a sentence of 20-25 years for such a defendant,
a prescription consistent with the 25-year sentence
imposed after trial on Bernie Ebbers, president and CEO
of WorldCom, and the is-year sentence imposed on John
Rigas, chairman and CEO of Adelphia Communications.2
6
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Figure A: Description of Representative Defendants
Def. A Teller in federally insured bank. Steals $2,000 from teller drawer.
Def. B Wife of social security recipient. Continues to cash checks after death of spouse. Loss = $n,ooo.
Def. C Defendant is a postal worker who steals credit cards from the mail and uses them to purchase goods worth $35,000,
which he then sells to support a drug habit.
Def. D Defendant commits online auction fraud from his home computer. Causes loss of $55,000 to more than fifty victims.
Def. E Doctor submits false billings to Medicare using complex system of double books. Loss = $125,000.
Def. F Telemarketer runs boiler room with eight employees. Defrauds more than 25o elderly victims of $250,000.
Def. G Computer expert constructs scheme for stealing credit card and other personal information online. Using this infor-
mation, he obtains merchandise and phony car loans online totaling $450,000 from twenty-five individual and
institutional victims.
Def. H President of small, publicly traded bank commits bank fraud causing loss of $i.i million and collapse of the bank.
In the course of the offense, he causes false statements to be made in required SEC filings. Thirty employees lose
their jobs.
Def. I CEO of publicly traded corporation operating chain of hospitals and nursing homes, in collusion with four other
members of his management team, defrauds Medicaid and Medicare of $io.i million and causes false statements to
be made in required SEC filings.
Def. J CEO of large conglomerate, in collusion with CFO and other members of management, engage in accounting fraud
and stock manipulation causing bankruptcy of company and losses to shareholders and employee pension fund of
$410 million.
Figure B: Guideline Range of Representative Defendants under Existing Guidelines
27
(shaded boxes indicate sentence increase due to guidelines change)
1987 1989 i991 1998 Nov. 2001 Jan. 2003
Def. A o-6 mos. 18 o-6 mos. 9  o-6 mos. o-6 mos. o-6 mos. o-6 mos.
Def. B 2-8 mos. 30  4-10 mos.3 4-10 mos. 4-10 mos. 6-12 mos. 1 -14 M0,33
Def. C 12-18 mos.34  15-21 mOS. 3 5  15-21 mos. 15-21 mos. 27-33 nos.3
6  30-37 mos 7
Def. D lO-16 mos.3S 12-18 mos,39  12-18 mos. 12-18 mos. 27-33 mos
40  30-37 ios.4
Def. E 21-27 mos. 4 2 24-30 mos. 43 24-30 mos. 24-30 mos. 33-41 mos-f
4  37-46 nos,04 5
Def. F 37-46 mos.46  4-51 mos.47  41-51 mos. L7. -6] 78-97 mos 49  108-135 m1,10s
Def. G 24-30 mos. 30-37 ins 30-37 mos. 30-37 mos. 78-97 mos.'
3  87-108 ms,'4
Def. H 27-33 mos.55 37-46 mos.56  57--71 nios.- 57-71 mos. 1i2-151 mo-s. 210-262 mos.
5
Def. I 57-71 mos. 6 o  87-io8 mos. 6 , 87-io8 mos. 87-1o8 mos. i5i-i88 mos.'z 262-327 1os.11 '
Def. J 57-71 mos.6 4 121-151 mos.6 L I2FE5 mos. f"'-i88miE -
I (plus 5 levels) (plUS I levels)
Figure C: Guideline Range of
Representative Defendants under Model
Sentencing Guidelines69
Defendant Offense Level Factors Sentencing Range (mos.)
Def A I Base Offense Level (BOL) = i o-6
Def. B 2 BOL = I; loss = 1 6-12
Def. C 3 BOL = i; loss = I;
abuse of trust = i 12-24
Def. D 4 BOL = i; loss = 2;
more than 25 victims = I 24-6o
Def. E 4 BOL = i; loss = 2;
abuse of trust = i 24-6o
Def. F 6 BOL = i; loss = 3;
more than 25 victims = I; aggravating role - 170 96-132
Def. G 5 BOL = i; loss = 3;
more than 25 victims = I 6o-96
Def. H 7 BOL = 1; loss = 4;
solv = i; president publicly traded corporation = 1 132-i8o
Def. 1 6 BOL = i; loss = 4;
CEO publicly traded corporation = i 96-132
Def. J BOL = 1; loss = 7;
CEO publicly traded corporation = I; 240-300
endanger solvency large organization = i
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scheme for federal economic offenses).
4 U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(1) (loss table) (2005).
5 U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (b)(9) (mass marketing and
sophisticated means enhancements) (2005).
6 U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(2)(A)-(C) (enhancements for multiple vic-
tims) (2005).
7 U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(13)(A) (enhancement for $1 million gross
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8 U.S.S.G. §2B11.(b)(13)(B) (enhancement for jeopardizing
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201.
11 An increase in offense level from 6 to 7 has no effect on a
first-time offender's sentencing range, which remains at 0-6
months. U.S.S.G. §5A (Sentencing Table) (2005).
12 An increase in offense level from 41 to 42 changes the sen-
tencing range for a first-time offender from 324-405 months
to 360 months-life imprisonment. U.S.S.G. §5A (Sentencing
Table) (2005).
13 This result assumes a fraud conviction with a Base Offense
Level of 7, U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(a) (2005); an increase of 30 lev-
els for a loss exceeding $400 million, §2B1.1(b)(1)(N); an
increase of 4 levels for more than 250 victims,
§2B1. 1(b)(2)(B); an increase of 2 levels for sophisticated
means, §2B1.1(b)(8); an increase of 2 levels for in excess of
$1 million in gross receipts, §2B1.1(b)(12)(A); an increase of
4 levels for the offense involving a securities law violation and
being the CEO of the company, §2B1.1(b)(15)(A); an increase
of 4 levels for aggravating role, §3B1.1(a); and a possible
increase of 2 levels for obstruction of justice based on testi-
mony during the trial, §3C1.1.
14 This calculation assumes a base offense level of 20, U.S.S.G.
§2B3. 1(a); an increase of 2 levels for robbery of a financial
institution, §2B3.1(b)(1); the maximum permissible increase
of 11 levels for use of a weapon and injury to a victim,
§2B3. 1(b)(2), (3); an increase of 4 levels for abducting a per-
son to facilitate commission of the offense or escape
therefrom, §2B3.1(b)(4); and an increase of 7 levels for loss
exceeding $5 million, §2B3.1(b)(7)(H).
15 The offense level for one count of first-degree murder is 43,
U.S.S.G. §2A1.1 (2005). Under the Guidelines' multi-count
rules, the additional forty-nine murders could add only five
additional offense levels. U.S.S.G. §3D1.4 (2005).
16 U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 2005 Sourcebook of Federal Sen-
tencing Statistics 256 tbl. 14 (2006) (hereinafter "2005
Sourcebook").
17 Id. at 257.
18 Id. at 256 (reporting that the mean sentence for defendants
convicted of murder in the portion of FY 2005 after the deci-
sion in United States v. Booker was 220 months).
19 Id. at 257 (reporting that the average sentence for a con-
victed murderer who was also a Criminal History Category VI
career offender was 297.5 months).
20 This result assumes a fraud conviction with a Base Offense
Level of 7, U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(a) (2005); an increase of 18 lev-
els for a loss exceeding $2.5 million, §2B1.1(b)(1)(N); an
increase of 4 levels for more than 250 victims,
§2B1.1(b)(2)(B); an increase of 2 levels for sophisticated
means, §2B1.1(b)(8); an increase of 2 levels for in excess of
$1 million in gross receipts, §2B1.1(b)(12)(A); an increase of
4 levels for the offense involving a securities law violation and
being an officer of the company, §2B1.1(b)(15)(A); an
increase of 4 levels for aggravating role, §3B1.1(a); and a
possible increase of 2 levels for obstruction of justice based
on testimony during the trial, §3C1.1, for a total offense level
of 43, or life imprisonment.
21 I use the word "purport" advisedly, because there is good rea-
son to doubt that even federal prosecutors are very often
prepared to enforce the white-collar sentencing rules as writ-
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ten. Note, for example, that none of the defendants in the high-
profile post-Enron cases has so far received a life sentence and
that many, perhaps most, of the non-CEO defendants in these
cases have been the beneficiaries of plea agreements that
employ charge bargaining to cap their sentences and thus
avoid the full force of the sentencing guidelines.
22 For example, in FY 2003, only eight defendants were sen-
tenced in cases involving an adjustment for a loss exceeding
$20 million. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Use of Guidelines and
Specific Offense Characteristics, Fiscal Year 2003, 6-7 (avail-
able at https://www.ussc.gov/GAF/03-gluse.pdf). This
number will, of course, fluctuate from year to year, but it
seems highly improbable that the total population of cases
with losses this large would ever be more than a few dozen
annually.
23 Frank 0. Bowman, Il, Editor's Observations; 'Tis a Gift to Be
Simple: A Model Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
18 FED. SENT. REP. 310 (2006).
24 See Bowman, Pour Encourager les Autres, supra note 2, at 427-
31.
25 U.S.S.G. §2B1.1 app. note 4(C) (2005) (equating theft of
undelivered mail from an authorized mail receptacle to vic-
timization of at least fifty victims, with a concomitant offense
level increase of four or more offense levels pursuant to
§2B1.1(b)(2)).
26 For a recitation of sentences imposed in these and other
recent high-profile white-collar cases, see Sentencing Memo-
randum of Jamie Ois, United States v. Ois, Case No.
H-03-CR-217 (S.D. Tex.), at 21-22 (available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
Sentencing81806.pdf).
27 Figure B assumes first-time offenders (Criminal History Cate-
gory I) convicted after trial. Sentences for defendants
pleading guilty would be slightly lower. Sentences for defen-
dants with criminal records would be slightly (in some cases
considerably) higher.
28 Offense Level 6. Assumes no "more than minimal planning"
(MMP).
29 Offense Level 6. Assumes no MMR
30 Offense Level 8. Assumes no MMR
31 Offense Level 9. Assumes no MMR
32 Offense Level 10. Assumes no MMR
33 Offense Level 11. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of four levels for loss greater than
$10,000.
34 Offense Level 13. Assumes fraud conviction, MMP, two-level
abuse of trust.
35 Offense Level 14. Assumes fraud conviction, MMP two-level
abuse of trust.
36 Offense Level 18. Assumes Base Offense Level of 6, increase
of six levels for loss greater than $30,000, four-level increase
for undelivered U.S. mail (U.S.S.G. §2B1.1 app. note 3(B)
(2001)), two-level increase for abuse of trust.
37 Offense Level 19. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of six levels for loss greater than $30,000,
four-level increase for undelivered U.S. mail (U.S.S.G. §2B1.1
app. note 4(C)(i) (2003)), two-level increase for abuse of
trust.
38 Offense Level 12. Assumes MMR
39 Offense Level 13. Assumes MMR
40 Offense Level 18. Assumes fraud conviction, four-level > 50
victims, and two-level sophisticated means.
41 Offense Level 19. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), four-level > 50 victims, and two-level sophisticated
means.
42 Offense Level 16. Assumes MMP, two-level abuse of trust.
43 Offense Level 17. Assumes MMP, two-level abuse of trust.
44 Offense Level 20. Assumes fraud conviction, two-level sophis-
ticated means, two-level abuse of trust.
45 Offense Level 21. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), two-level sophisticated means, two-level abuse of
trust.
46 Offense Level 21. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level vulnerable victim.
47 Offense Level 22. Assumes MMP four-level aggravating role,
two-level vulnerable victim.
48 Offense Level 24. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level vulnerable victim, two-level mass marketing.
49 Offense Level 28. Assumes four-level > 50 victims, four-level
aggravating role, two-level vulnerable victim.
50 Offense Level 31. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), six-level increase for more than 250 victims, four-
level aggravating role, two-level vulnerable victim.
51 Offense Level 17. Assumes MMP two-level use of special
skill.
52 Offense Level 19. Assumes MMP, two-level use of special
skill.
53 Offense Level 26. Assumes two-level sophisticated means, two-
level access device/means of identification, two-level increase
for more than ten victims, two-level use of special skill.
54 Offense Level 29. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of fourteen levels for loss greater than
• $400,000, two-level sophisticated means, two-level access
device/means of identification, two-level > 10 victims, two-
level use of special skill.
55 Offense Level 18. Assumes MMP, two-level abuse of trust.
56 Offense Level 21. Assumes MMP two-level abuse of trust.
57 Offense Level 21. Assumes MMPR two-level abuse of trust,
four-level endanger financial institution.
58 Offense Level 32. Assumes two-level >10 victims, two-level
sophisticated means, four-level jeopardize financial institu-
tion, two-level abuse of trust.
59 Offense Level 37. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of sixteen levels for loss, two-level increase
for more than ten victims, two-level sophisticated means,
four-level jeopardize financial institution, four-level officer of
publicly traded corporation, two-level abuse of trust.
60 Offense Level 25. Assumes MMP four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
61 Offense Level 29. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
62 Offense Level 34. Assumes two-level sophisticated means,
four-level aggravating role, two-level abuse of trust.
63 Offense Level 39. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of twenty levels for loss, two-level sophisti-
cated means, four-level violation of securities law by officer of
publicly traded corporation, four-level aggravating role, two-
level abuse of trust.
64 Offense Level 25. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
65 Offense Level 32. Assumes MMP four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
66 Offense Level 34. Assumes MMP, two-level sophisticated
means, four-level aggravating role, two-level abuse of trust.
67 Offense Level 48. Assumes four-level > 50 victims, two-level
sophisticated means, four-level jeopardize soundness of
financial institution (pension fund), fourlevel aggravating
role, two-level abuse of trust.
68 Offense Level 59. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of thirty levels for loss, six-level > 250 vic-
tims, two-level sophisticated means, four-level jeopardize
soundness of financial institution (pension fund), four-level
violation of securities law by officer of publicly traded corpo-
ration, four-level aggravating role, two-level abuse of trust.
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69 Figure C assumes first-time offenders (Criminal History
Category I) convicted after trial. Sentences for defendants
pleading guilty would be lower. Sentences for defendants
with criminal records would be higher.
70 Note that the offense level for Defendant F does not
include an increase for the fact that the victims were
arguably vulnerable senior citizens. This omission does
not necessarily reflect a considered policy choice. Rather,
the model guidelines proposed in this Issue contain no vic-
tim adjustments. If an offense level enhancement for
vulnerable victims were to be adopted, it might apply to
this case.
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